The Nuclear Security Summit held in Washington, DC, on April 12-13, 2010, was an unprecedented event and a significant success. It brought together leaders from 47 nations and three international organizations to discuss how to prevent nuclear terrorism by improving global nuclear material security. There has never been such a gathering of high-level political officials to discuss this subject. And high-level political attention is essential to motivate rapid action on this important agenda.

The participants agreed to a communiqué that highlighted the global importance of preventing nuclear terrorism and endorsed President Obama’s goal of securing all vulnerable nuclear material in four years. Additionally, they underscored the importance of maintaining effective security over all nuclear materials on their territory; encouraged the conversion of reactors that use highly enriched uranium (HEU), a weapon useable nuclear material, to low-enriched uranium (LEU); and recognized the importance of the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material as amended and the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism as essential elements of the global nuclear security architecture. Finally, the communiqué emphasized the need for international cooperation on this agenda including the importance of capacity building and responding to requests for assistance in order to secure these materials globally.

The work plan accompanying the communiqué focused on improving and universalizing existing nuclear security agreements and programs. In addition to the conventions mentioned in the communiqué, the work plan also notes the need to fully implement UN Security Council Resolution 1540 and support the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism and the G-8 Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction. It also recognizes the continuing importance of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and its guidelines. It underscores the need for robust and independent nuclear regulatory capabilities in all countries, the requirement for the prevention of nuclear trafficking, and the improvement in nuclear detection and forensics. It further highlights the fundamental role of the nuclear industry in the nuclear security agenda and the importance of sharing best security practices and the human dimension of nuclear security.

Perhaps the most far-reaching objectives of the work plan included the consideration of the consolidation of national sites where nuclear material is stored, the removal and disposal of nuclear materials no longer needed for operational activities, and the conversion of HEU-fueled reactors to LEU fuels. In keeping with the need to maintain consensus on these high-level objectives, the work plan offers many caveats including allowing individual nations to implement many of these objectives “as appropriate.”

New Commitments
In addition to the work plan, 29 individual countries made commitments for improving security at home. The highlights of these commitments included the removal of all the remaining HEU in Ukraine by 2012; Canada agreeing to return a large amount of spent fuel containing HEU to the United States; the United States and Russia signing an agreement to implement the plutonium disposition agreement; and the decisions by India and China to establish nuclear security centers of excellence.

Finally, there were some funding commitments that were made at the summit. These included a pledge of $6 million by the United Kingdom and $300,000 by Belgium for the IAEA’s Nuclear Security Fund, $100 million from Canada for security cooperation with Russia, and a call by President Obama for an additional $10 billion for the Global Partnership.

While all of these achievements are important, there are three areas where the summit could have done more. The first is on the funding issue. At the very least, the IAEA’s nuclear security office is in need of significant additional funding. Second, the issue of radiological material security was not afforded a high priority at the summit. While it was referenced in both the communiqué and the work plan, a number of counties would have liked to have seen that issue be a higher priority. Finally, there were no new initiatives announced. While there may be some international fatigue with the current set of activities, when combined, they are still inadequate to the task of effectively preventing nuclear terrorism.

Where Do We Go From Here
The Nuclear Security Summit has significantly raised the public profile of the nuclear material security and nuclear terrorism prevention issues. It also has resulted in some new commitments and actions that will be taken by participating nations.

In the post-summit period it will be important to keep the dialogue among nations moving, expand the engagement beyond just the summit attendees, and also to report on progress.

The commitments made at the summit need to be implemented as rapidly as possible. By setting another meeting in South Korea for 2012, the summit participants have built in a forcing mechanism that will require them to fulfill their commitments.

But new initiatives need to be debated and implemented. Nuclear terrorism and nuclear security are complex transnational issues. Right now we have many disconnected components, and there is no cohesive and integrated driving mechanism. The key to success in driving collective and unified action on this agenda in the wake of the summit is to integrate all the necessary tools into a comprehensive, flexible, legitimate, and globally focused next generation nuclear material security framework.

This framework agreement would identify the threats to humankind from vulnerable fissile materials, especially the threats posed by terrorists, and list actions required to mitigate them. A framework agreement would allow the subject to be acknowledged at a very high political level as a global priority and then require the adherents to take specific steps to achieve the agreement’s objectives.

The president has taken an important step forward in establishing global fissile material security as a top-level international objective. But the status quo for protecting the globe against nuclear terrorism is inadequate and additional steps need to be taken.

Editor’s note. Adapted from congressional testimony given by Kenneth Luongo, president of the Partnership for Global Security, to the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the US House of Representatives on April 21, 2010. Visit www.partnershipforglobalsecurity.org for the full text of his testimony.